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NOTES
The Improper Use of Presumptions in
Recent Criminal Law Adjudication
When the factfinder in a criminal trial relies on a presumption
to convict a defendant, the factfinder formally infers from a
proved fact the existence of another, unproved fact.' Criminal
presumptions "bridge the gap" between external, objective
states of affairs and internal, subjective states of knowledge or
intent that form the basis of all non-strict liability crimes. 2 Such
1. A presumption operates when evidence sufficient to establish state of affairs "A"
(sometimes called the "proved fact") is taken to prove-in the absence of evidence to the
contrary-state of affairs "B" (sometimes called the "presumed fact"). "In its simplest form a
presumption is an inference permitted or required by law of the existence of one fact, which is
unknown or which cannot be proved, from another fact which has been proved." United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 78 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Presumptions may arise
through legislative enactment or through the development ofjudicial doctrine.
Presumptions obviate the need for further evidence on a specific issue and shift the "bur-
den of producing evidence" to the party to whom the presumption applies. Presumptions do
not alter the "burden ofpersuasion." See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 524 (1979); B.
JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11 (5th ed. 1958); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 314, 337 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2490 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in
Crminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ. 165 (1969); Note, The Unconstitutionality of
St atutoiy Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970); Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmaking
In Crninal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 HARV. L. REV. 321
(1980); McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden of Persuasion, 68
HARV. L. REV. 1382 (1955). But see Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof 47 HARV. L. REV. 59 (1933); Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 906, 916-24 (1931).
Presumptions operate only in the absence of evidence. If sufficient evidence is available,
or if special circumstances alter the general fact situations they govern, presumptions do not
apply. See generally Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The I'alue of Complkvity, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1187 (1979).
2. Although not all criminal presumptions refer explicitly to intent, it is useful to think of
them as doing so. In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the statute at issue made
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon presumptive evidence that the firearm had been
transported or received in interstate or foreign commerce. Even though this presumption
does not specifically mention intent, or scienter, these subjective states are inferred under gen-
eral principles requiring blameworthiness. As a rebuttal to the Tot presumption, the defend-
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subjective states are "proved"-unless rebutted 3 -if the circum-
stances that govern application of the presumption exist.4 With
the help of a presumption, the prosecution can obtain a convic-
tion solely on the basis of inferential evidence of intent.
The Supreme Court has approved the use of presumptions in
criminal trials only when those presumptions meet certain stan-
dards of accuracy and reliability; when they do not, defendants
have successfully attacked them under the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 5 Recently, the Court has
distinguished between "permissive" and "mandatory" presump-
ant might attempt to demonstrate that he had received the firearm without his knowledge and
against his wishes, and that, at the time of arrest, he was bringing it to the authorities.
The presumptions at issue in United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), and United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), made unexplained presence at the site of an illegal still
presumptive evidence of owning and operating the still. Since owning or operating a still
normally cannot take place unknowingly, the legislature must have intended that these crimes
include a subjective element. Proving that the defendant had accidentally stumbled upon the
site of the still, then, should rebut the presumption. Cf note 12 infra (discussing the Court's
reasoning in Romano and Gainey).
3. Commentators divide when discussing the quantity and type of evidence necessary to
rebut a presumption. Some maintain that almost any relevant evidence will suffice; others
claim that "some" evidence is necessary; and still others argue that "substantial" evidence is
required. This note adopts the view that a presumption should not reverse or otherwise affect
the overall "burden of proof" (or "risk of non-persuasion").
The effect of failure to meet the "burden of production" in a criminal trial is significantly
harsher for the prosecution than for the defendant. If the prosecution fails to meet its bur-
den, a directed verdict of acquittal should result. But such a direct effect does not occur when
the defendant fails to meet the burden of production, since verdicts may not be directed
against defendants in criminal cases. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 516 n.5
(1979); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); United Bhd.
of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 (1947); Sparf & Hansen v. United States,
156 U.S. 51, 105-06 (1895).
4. Presumptions are relied upon to demonstrate knowledge or intent because evidence
of subjective states of mind is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Distinguishing subjective
states of mind presents intractable methodological and theoretical problems. See Heller, Is the
Charitable Exemption from Property Taxation an Easy Case? General Concerns abot Legal Economics and
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 183-87, 236-51
(D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979); Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Laze, 33
STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981) (describing the time dependency of the concept of "criminal in-
tent"). These theoretical barriers will be disregarded here to the extent possible.
One of the main justifications for presumptions at common law was the relative ease or
convenience of producing relevant evidence. That justification has not been followed in the
criminal law. See text accompanying notes 9-17 infra. "The argument from [comparative]
convenience is admissible only where the inference is a permissible one .... " Tot. 319 U.S.
at 469. The defendant will almost always be more familiar with his or her subjective mental
state than the prosecution, but that alone cannot justify placing the burden of producing evi-
dence upon a defendant in a criminal case. Id.; see also text accompanying notes 54-71 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 9-71 ina.
PRESUMPTIONS
tions.6 Permissive presumptions "may, but need not, be relied
on by the jury" in reaching its verdict; mandatory presumptions
must be followed unless rebutted.7 The Court has applied a
more relaxed standard of due process review to permissive than
to mandatory presumptions.
This note argues that, in developing the contemporary
mandatory-permissive standard, the Court has misunderstood
the effects of presumptions on juries. Presumptions that are
"permissive" in theory may nevertheless be "mandatory" in fact,
thereby leading some juries to convict regardless of their beliefs
and inclinations. Thus, these legal presumptions may undermine
the moral sense and political function of the jury.
Part I of this note shows, through doctrinal analysis, that the
mandatory-permissive distinction is an anomaly in the Court's ju-
risprudence. Part II shows that this distinction is at variance with
a substantial body of empirical social science research. This part
suggests that jurors are influenced significantly by the authority-
laden legal structure surrounding judicial instructions on all pre-
sumptions-however permissive in theory. Part III proposes that
the distinction between "mandatory" and "permissive" pre-
sumptions be abandoned, and that "reasonable-doubt" due pro-
cess scrutiny8 be applied to all presumptions. This proposal
would help to prevent the improper use of presumptions and en-
sure that jury verdicts reflect jurors' actual beliefs.
I. EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE
A. Presumptions as Empirical Generalizations
The Supreme Court's recent treatment of criminal presump-
tions dates back to the 1943 case of Tot v. United States,9 which
announced a "rational connection" test for the validity of pre-
sumptions. If there is no "rational connection" between the pre-
sumed fact and the proved fact, or if the connection between the
two is arbitrary or inconsistent with ordinary experience, the pre-
6. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); H.R. Doc. No. 46,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) (proposed rule of evidence).
7. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157.
8. The Supreme Court has held that the due process clause protects the accused against
conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (emphasis
added); accord Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977).
9. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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sumption violates the due process clauses of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.1 0
The Tot Court intended to set limits on the power of Con-
gress and state legislatures to make the proof of one fact (or set
of facts) evidence of an ultimate, inculpatory fact.1  Only if rea-
son and experience support the inference-that is, if it is prob-
able that if the proved fact is true then the inculpatory fact will
also be true-will the prosecution be relieved of its burden of
production and proof. Tot thus set standards for convictions ob-
tained solely on the basis of inferential proof.' 2
In taking as its theoretical point of departure the view that
reason and experience must support a presumption, the Tot
Court indicated its adherence to a specific conception of pre-
sumptions.1 3 According to this conception, presumptions ex-
press general truths about the way people behave in certain
circumstances; the party against whom a presumption operates is
a particular case to which the general truth of the presumption
applies.' 4 Inferential proof of presumed intent runs as follows:
It is generally true that if a defendant has done X, he wanted Y to
10. Id. at 467.
11. Id. at 467-68 ("[W]here the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable
relation to the circumstances of life as we know them, it is not competent for the legislature to
create it as a rule governing the procedure of courts."). The statute at issue in Tot made it a
crime for convicted felons and "fugitives from justice" to receive firearms or ammunition that
had been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Mere possession was
deemed to satisfy the required jurisdictional element of interstate transportation. Federal
Firearms Act § 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250 (1938) (repealed 1968).
12. The Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965), and
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), are virtually identical applications of Tot's
"rational connection" test. The Court in Romano, however, strained to distinguish the offense
of "carrying on" the illegal operation of a still from the (allegedly narrower and "markedly
different") offense of "possession, custody, and control" of a still. Since "almost anyone"
present at a still is "very probably" assisting in "carrying on" its operations, the presumption
was sustained in Gainey, 380 U.S. at 67-68; cf Romano, 382 U.S. at 140-41 (discussing the
Gainey reasoning). But in Romano, the connection between presence and possession was found to
be "too tenuous to permit a reasonable inference of guilt." 382 U.S. at 141. "[T]here was a
much higher probability that mere presence could support an inference of guilt in the former
case than in the latter." Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16.
13. Tot, 319 U.S. at 467.
14. As the Supreme Court stated in MobileJ. & K.C.R.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S.
35, 42 (1910), "the strength of any inference of one fact from proof of another depends upon
the generality of the experience upon which it is founded." Justice Cardozo, writing in Morri-
son v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934), stated the same principle from the vantage point of
"reasonable expectations." In the case of a true presumption, said the Justice, "[w]hat is
proved must be so related to what is inferred. . . as to be at least a warning signal according
to the teachings of experience . . . . [E]xperience must teach that the evidence held to be
inculpatory has at least a sinister significance. ... Id. at 90. Justice Cardozo further ob-
426
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occur; this defendant has done X; therefore, this defendant in-
tended Y to occur.15
The formulation of the first, general proposition is the crucial
step; if it "express[es] the normal balance of probability,"' 6 its
application will be upheld in particular cases. But if the general
proposition is itself inherently improbable, then imposing it on
particular defendants is unfair. According to this view, the prob-
lem with formulating presumptions is in creating inferences that
closely approximate the actual state of the world and of human
behavior. Tot and its progeny view presumptions as attempts
to express empirical, probabilistic connections between events,
and to treat particular cases by reference to empirical
generalizations.17
The "rational connection" test of Tot was strengthened in
Leary v. United States.'8 Leary was charged with violating a federal
statute that made possession of marijuana sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction for "knowingly" and "illegally" importing
marijuana from abroad.' 9 The Leary Court asserted that a crimi-
served that possession of land, unless by an individual ineligible for citizenship, carried with it
"not even a hint of criminality." Id.
For an example of the reasoning in Tot, see the statute at issue in Manley v. Georgia, 279
U.S. 1 (1929), which provided that "[elvery insolvency of a bank shall be deemed fraudulent,
and the president and directors shall be severally punished by imprisonment and labor in the
penitentiary. ... Id. at 3-4. This rather severe presumption was successfully attacked as
"unreasonable and arbitrary"; the proof sufficient to make a prima facie case "points to no
specific transaction, matter or thing as the cause of the fraudulent insolvency or to any act or
omission of the accused tending to show his responsibility. . . .The connection between the
fact proved and that presumed is not sufficient. Reasoning does not lead from one to the
other." Id. at 7.
Cardozean analysis can also reach the same result: Merely being the president or director
of an insolvent bank does not reasonably put one on notice of fraud. Nor does it "awaken a
belief that [one] is guilty if he fails to come forward with excuse or explanation." Morrison,
291 U.S. at 90. This analysis is particularly useful in attacking presumptions that invoke unre-
lated jurisdictional elements. See, e.g., Tot, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) (presumption of interstate or
foreign commerce connected with firearm possession by a felon); Leary v. United States, 395
U.S. 6 (1969) (presumption of illegal importation tied to marijuana possession); Barnes v.
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (presumption of federal mail use linked to possession of
stolen U.S. Treasury checks); see also Nesson, supra note 1, at 1215-21 (inferences relating to
jurisdiction).
15. See generally Ullmann-Margalit, On Presumption, 80J. PHIL. 143 (1983).
16. Tot, 319 U.S. at 469.
17. The Gainey and Romano decisions are clearly based on generalized empirical proposi-
tions. The Gainey presumption "did no more than 'accord to the evidence, if unexplained, its
natural probative force.'" 380 U.S. at 71 (quoting McNamara v. Henkel, 226 U.S. 520, 525
(1913)).
18. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
19. Id. at 10-I1.
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nal presumption is irrational or arbitrary unless there is "sub-
stantial assurance" that the presumed fact "more likely than not"
follows from the proved fact.20 On the basis of detailed empirical
findings, the Court determined that it could not say with any as-
surance that a majority of marijuana possessors "knew" the
source of their marijuana. Thus it would be unreasonable to pre-
sume that Leary knew that his marijuana had been illegally
imported.2'
The "more likely than not" criterion of Leary is a more pre-
cisely formulated statement of Tot's theory of empirical
probability. The "more likely than not" test means that a pre-
sumption will be upheld if it is correct more than 50 percent of
the time. Probably nothing more than judicial delicacy and an
appreciation of the inherent imprecision in such matters pre-
vented the Court from expressing this rule mathematically. But
the Leavy Court indicated on several occasions that, if "a majority
of marijuana possessors 'kn[e]w' that their marijuana was illegally
imported," the statute would be upheld. 22
20. Id at 36. The introduction of this "more likely than not" language required the
Court to delve into the realm of empirical proof and to take judicial notice of legislative facts.
In addition to vast amounts of testimony and congressional committee reports, Justice
Harlan's clerk consulted approximately 25 studies on the sources of marijuana and on the
beliefs of marijuana smokers as to those sources. See id at 53 n.l 16 (noting proudly that
"there is no indication that in any of these [lower court] cases the court had before it or took
into account even a fraction of the evidence which we have considered"). This support was
necessary to sustain the Court's novel form of argumentation and to determine whether a
presumption "more likely than not" expressed a valid inference to the truth of the presumed
fact.
21. Id. at 52-53; cf Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970), in which the defendant
was convicted under provisions of a federal statute (covering "narcotic drugs") which were
virtually identical to the one at issue in Leary. The Court upheld Turner's conviction on her-
oin charges, but reversed his conviction on cocaine charges. The Court found "overwhelming
[empirical] evidence" that heroin consumed in the United States is illegally imported; there-
fore, "[tlo possess heroin is to possess imported heroin." Id. at 415-16. According to the
Court, "Turner doubtless knew that his heroin came from abroad," unless he had practiced
"a studied ignorance to which . . . [he was] not entitled." Id. at 416-17. The Court con-
cluded that, with respect to heroin, the statutory presumption satisfied a "reasonable-doubt"
standard, see text accompanying notes 25-37 infra, as well as the "more likely than not" crite-
rion.
On the other hand, the Court found that more cocaine was lawfully produced in this
country than was smuggled in from abroad. Since there was a substantial possibility that Tur-
ner's cocaine had been stolen, rather than imported, the presumption of "knowing, illegal
importation" did not meet the "more likely than not" test when applied to cocaine. Id at
422-24.
22. Leary, 395 U.S. at 46; see also id. at 37- 39, 46-47, 52-53. The Court noted that "[t]he
process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical ....
Id. at 35 (quoting Gainey).
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The Leary decision illustrates how the analysis of a presump-
tion's constitutional validity becomes "logically divorced from
. . .[the particular facts presented by the State] and based [in-
stead] on the presumption's accuracy in the run of cases." 23
"[T]hat petitioner himself testified at trial that he had no knowl-
edge of the marihuana's origin [was irrelevant]."24 If the validity
of presumptions depends on "the strength of the connection"
between proved facts and presumed facts, evidence bearing on
the presumed fact is logically irrelevant. Indeed, if the Supreme
Court's theory of presumptions is followed to its ultimate conclu-
sion, the presumptions themselves become the "facts" on trial.
B. The Imposition of Reasonable-Doubt Constraints
The applicability of reasonable-doubt due process scrutiny to
criminal presumptions was established in the 1970 decision of In
re J4inship.25 Winship concerned a juvenile proceeding in which a
determination of guilt, made "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence," subjected a young boy to confinement in a training
school for up to six years. The Court reversed on grounds that
"the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact nec-
essary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 26
23. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159.
24. Leary, 395 U.S. at 32 n.55.
Despite the fact that the defendant was well educated [Dr. Leary was a Professor of
Psychology at Harvard University] and had recently traveled to a country that is a
major exporter of marihuana to this country, the Court found the presumption of
knowledge of importation from possession irrational. It did so, not because Dr.
Leary was unlikely to know the source of the marihuana, but instead because 'a ma-
jority of possessors' were unlikely to have such knowledge.
Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159 n.17. This does not mean that the presumption at issue was
irrebuttable or conclusive; the Leary Court noted later in the same footnote that the presump-
tion was "by its terms rebuttable."
A problem arose in Leary because the jury might have convicted solely on the basis of a
presumption that did not meet the requirements of due process. See Leary, 395 U.S. at 31
("For all we know, the conviction did rest on that ground."); Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159
n.17 ("[There] was.., no certainty [in Leary] that the jury had not relied upon the presump-
tion."). Thus Leary's own testimony was "irrelevant," because he should not have beenforced
to rebut a constitutionally impermissible presumption in order to win an acquittal. In effect,
the presumption shifted the burden of proof. See note 37 infra and accompanying text; see also
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 (1983) ("An erroneous presumption on a disputed
element of the crime renders irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have
relied upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence.").
25. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
26. Id. at 364.
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Barnes v. United States27 was the first important post-Winship de-
cision reviewing a criminal presumption. In Barnes the defendant
was convicted of knowingly possessing stolen United States
Treasury checks. The trial court instructed the jury that
"[p]ossession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily ex-
plained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which you may reason-
ably draw the inference and find, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances shown by the evidence in the case, that the person
in possession knew the property had been stolen." 28
After a review of Gainey, Romano, Leary, and Turner-the teach-
ings of which were "not altogether clear"-the Supreme Court
noted that the challenged jury instruction in Barnes was a tradi-
tional inference deeply rooted in the common law.2 9 Barnes had
been found in possession of stolen Treasury checks payable to
persons he did not know, and had provided no plausible explana-
tion consistent with innocence. "On the basis of this evidence
alone," the Court concluded, "common sense and experience
tell us that petitioner must have known or been aware of the high
probability that the checks were stolen." 30 In fact, the Court de-
cided, the presumption met not only the "more likely than not"
criterion of Leary, but also the reasonable doubt standard.3 1 A
presumption meeting the former standard, but not the latter, had
yet to come before the Court.
The Winship principle was strengthened in Mullaney v. Wil-
bur.32 A Maine law required a defendant to prove, by a "fair
preponderance" of the evidence, that he had acted "in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation" in order to reduce a murder
charge to manslaughter. This requirement amounted to a rebut-
table presumption that homicide was punishable as murder.33
27. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
28. Id. at 840 n.3.
29. Id. at 843.
30. Id. at 845.
31. Id. at 846 n. 11. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall registered strong dissents
in Barnes, citing Winship and the "no evidence" rule of Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362
U.S. 199 (1960). They also criticized the majority for not undertaking empirical inquiries,
such as those made in Leary and Turner, which might have uncovered other sources of stolen
checks that did not implicate federal jurisdiction. As Justice Douglas put it, "[wlithout some
evidence or statistics . . . we have no way of assessing the likelihood that this petitioner knew
that these checks were stolen from the mails." Barnes, 412 U.S. at 852 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
33. The Maine law comported with early common law doctrine in that unlawful homi-
cide was "presumed to be malicious," and thus punishable as murder, absent proof that it
430 [Vol. 38:423
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The State of Maine argued that Winship did not apply, since
the presence of provocation was not a "fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime" of felonious homicide in Maine, but merely a fac-
tor bearing on the extent of punishment. The Court responded
that on this reasoning Maine could simply redefine all assaults as
a single offense, punishable as murder, and then provide affirma-
tive defenses for all elements of aggravation.3 4
If the Winship decision were limited by a state's definition of
crimes, Maine could thus shift the entire burden of proof to the
defendant without substantively changing its criminal law. This
would, of course, "undermine many of the interests that [Winship]
sought to protect."35 Under Maine's "fair preponderance" bur-
den of proof, a finding of murder could result even where the
evidence indicated that the defendant as likely as not deserved a
significantly less severe sentence. 36 The Mullaney Court empha-
sized that the burden of proof in a criminal trial cannot be shifted
to the defendant by the operation of a presumption affecting the
degree of culpability or extent of punishment. The availability of
affirmative defenses does not relieve the prosecution of its obli-
gation to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all facts upon
which the degree of culpability and extent of punishment turn. 37
C. 'Mandatory' vs. 'Permissive' Presumptions, and Rebuttability
The case of County Court of Ulster County v. Allen38 represents a
marked departure from the due process analysis of Winship and
Mullaney. The Supreme Court in Ulster County introduced a dis-
tinction between "mandatory" presumptions, which must meet
resulted from "sudden and sufficiently violent provocation." 5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *201.
34. Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99 & n.24.
35. Id. at 698.
36. "In short, petitioners would limit Winship to those facts which, if not proved, would
wholly exonerate the defendant." Id. at 697. "Winship is concerned with substance rather
than this kind of formalism." Id at 699.
37. Id at 697-98, 701-04; see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 215 (1977) ("[a]
State must prove every ingredient of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and. . . it may
not shift the burden of proof to the defendant by presuming that ingredient upon proof of the
other elements of the offense.").
For a fuller discussion of the interplay between presumptions and affirmative defenses,
see Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 186-93 (1969);Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden
of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J 1325 (1979); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE LJ. 1299 (1977).
38. 442 U.S. 140 (1979).
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the reasonable doubt standard, and "permissive" presumptions,
which need only meet the "more likely than not" test of Leary.3 9
The Court appears to have created this distinction out of whole
cloth. As Justice Powell observed on behalf of four dissenters, "I
have found no recognition in the Court's prior decisions that this
distinction is important in analyzing presumptions used in crimi-
nal cases." 40
At any rate, according to the Ulster County theory the jury must
find the presumed fact, in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary, when given a mandatory presumption. The jury may, but
need not, find the presumed fact in the presence of the proved
fact when given a permissive presumption.4 1 An alternative defi-
nition used by the Court is: A mandatory presumption autho-
rizes conviction "even if thejury disbelieved all of the testimony"
and merely relied on the inferential proof afforded by the pre-
sumption;42 a permissive presumption, by contrast, may not be
the "sole and sufficient" basis for a finding of guilt.43 Although
the Court viewed the Ulster County decision as completing the un-
finished business of Leary,44 in many ways the new distinction
raised more problems than it solved.
Because a mandatory presumption can result in a conviction
even if there is no further evidence introduced on the presumed
fact, the validity of such a presumption is "logically divorced
from [the particular facts presented by the State] and based [in-
stead] on the presumption's accuracy in the run of cases." 45 But
with a "permissive" presumption the jury is not required or even
39. Id. at 157-67; see also H.R. Doc. No. 46, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1973) (proposed rule
of evidence).
40. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 170 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 176 (PowelIJ.,
dissenting) ("The Court's novel approach in this case appears to contradict prior decisions of
this Court reviewing such presumptions.").
41. Id. at 157-60.
42. Id. at 157 n.16.
43. Id. at 167. The first definition emphasizes the supposed powers, rights, and choices
of the jury, which this note argues are much more limited than has hitherto been recognized.
See text accompanying notes 97-101, 117-118, 120-147 infra. The second definition empha-
sizes the requirements of evidentiary sufficiency that the prosecution must meet. This second
sense of the mandatory-permissive distinction casts a more revealing light on the real nature
of presumptions. This note will accordingly use the latter definition.
44. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 171 n.5 (Powell,J., dissenting); see also Leary, 395 U.S. at 36
n.64.
45. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159. "[T]he Court has held it irrelevant in analyzing a
mandatory presumption . . . that there is ample evidence in the record other than the pre-
sumption to support a conviction." Id. at 160.
432 [Vol. 38:423
allowed to convict on the basis of the presumption alone. Since a
"permissive inference" is merely one, but not the sole and suffi-
cient, basis for a finding of guilt, there is no reason to require a
greater degree of probative force for this sort of presumption
than for other relevant evidence. 46 In short, the idea of requiring
a "rational connection" for presumptions seems to have fallen by
the wayside in Ulster County.47 As Justice Powell complained in
dissent, "[T]he Court in effect. . . construct[s] a rule that per-
mits the use of any inference-no matter how irrational in itself-
provided that otherwise there is sufficient evidence in the record
to support a finding of guilt." 48
The Supreme Court may have adopted the distinction be-
tween mandatory and permissive presumptions in response to
criticism from scholars who had developed explicit theories of
presumptions. For example, prior to Ulster County, Harold A.
Ashford and D. Michael Risinger had developed a mathematical-
probabilistic model for presumptions along the lines suggested
in Tot and Leary.49 However, they added a critical second factor
to the Court's analysis of presumptions as probabilistic infer-
ences: the probability that an innocent person can exonerate
himself (rebut the presumed fact) even in the presence of the
proved fact. They argued that to assess the true magnitude of
the "procedural hardship" imposed by a presumption, both fac-
tors must be considered. 50
46. Id. The Court's language in this passage lumps together presumptions, which are
rules of law, with evidence, which is not. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1966) ("A pre-
sumption is not evidence."); Rules of Evidence, 1974: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Conun. on theJudiciay, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1974) ("Presumptions are not evidence, but
ways of dealing with evidence.").
47. The Court analyzes the presumption in Ulster County solely as applied in that case and
not on its face. Thus, when the Court concludes that "[tihe permissive presumption, as used in
this case, satisfied the Leary test," 442 U.S. at 167 (emphasis added), it makes no claim that the
presumption, considered in isolation, would satisfy the Leay test.
48. Id. at 177 (Powell, J., dissenting).
49. Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37.
50. It is one thing to enact a statutory presumption that is correct only 70% of the time,
and quite another thing to enact such a statute when only one innocent person in a million
would have any trouble rebutting the presumption. Conversely, a "rational connection" of
90% is less justifiable when no innocent person to whom the presumption applies could over-
come the presumption. Ashford and Risinger conclude that "[o]ur courts cannot properly
perform their function of safeguarding criminal defendants from the operation of presump-
tions which violate due process by relying on a rational connection test alone." Ashford &
Risinger, supra note 37, at 185.
For example, if 90% of the persons who do A also commit the illegal act B, and of those
who do A but not B, 90% can exonerate themselves, an erroneous conviction rate of only
January 19861 PRESUMPTIONS 433
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:423
In a sense, the Court's mandatory-permissive distinction ad-
dresses the concern about wrongful convictions caused by the
difficulty of rebuttal (exoneration). It is more difficult to rebut a
presumption if the jury is mandatorily required, or allowed, to
convict solely on the basis of the presumption; opportunities for
exoneration are greater if the jury permissively makes a presump-
tion-assisted decision in the context of the entire evidentiary rec-
ord. Only in the latter case is evidence of particular facts
relevant. Permissive presumptions are in fact rebuttable, because
particularized evidence bolsters the decision to apply the pre-
sumption. If no defendant can rebut a permissive presumption,
the jury is unlikely to have a particularized factual basis for apply-
ing it. Mandatory presumptions are more appropriate in such
circumstances. 5'
However, this "ease of exoneration" factor stubbornly and in-
herently resists quantification. Quantifying ease of exoneration
would require data on the number of persons "actually" guilty,
against which the number of innocent persons who are wrong-
fully convicted could be compared. 52 Such data are lacking in
about 1.1% results. That is, of 100 people who did A, 90 will also have committed B and be
correctly convicted; of the remaining 10 who did A but did not commit B, only one will be
unable to exonerate himself and be erroneously convicted. Thus only one out of 91 was
erroneously convicted. To take another example, if both rates are changed to 70%, a wrong-
ful conviction percentage of about 11.4 results (i.e., 70 out of 100 are correctly convicted, plus
30% of the 30 innocent people, or 9 erroneous convictions, for a 9 out of 79 wrongful convic-
tion rate).
Nevertheless, any statute that required many innocent people to exonerate themselves
might be unacceptably "inquisitorial," however easy the exoneration. Ashford and Risinger
address this point: "The criminal law should be scrutinized not only from the point of view of
protecting innocent defendants against wrongful conviction. The principles implicit in the
term 'probable cause' require us also to provide reasonable protections against the arrest and
trial of innocent persons." Id. at 191.
51. If, however, defendants are placed at a disadvantage when rebutting a permissive
presumption, impermissible burden shifting might be hidden within that presumption. See
notes 24, 37 supra; notes 54-71 infra and accompanying text (finding impermissible burden
shifting when mandatory presumptions alter the burden of persuasion and rebuttal), espe-
cially note 70 (analyzing the jury instruction in Ulster County as mandatory rather than
permissive).
52. The most controversial feature of the Ashford-Risinger model, and one that the
mandatory-permissive distinction does not address, is the proposal that "acceptable" rates or
levels of erroneous convictions be expressed in fairly specific mathematical or statistical terms.
"[W]e submit," the authors state, "that a standard of precision approaching 99%, and cer-
tainly greater than 90%, should be required before a presumption can be constitutionally
sustained consistent with notions of due process." Ashford & Risinger, supra note 37, at 183.
"Percentages," the authors continue somewhat obscurely, "although not subject to precise
determination, have a shorthand value in suggesting analogous subjective limitations upon
the acceptable standard of imprecision .... " Id.; see also Broun & Kelly, Playing the Percentages
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principle, but they would be required to ensure that the
mandatory-permissive distinction is being properly applied.5 3
Thus, the mandatory-permissive distinction provides no easy or
mechanical way of deciding criminal presumption cases. The
Court must still rely on its own understanding of the effects of
such presumptions on jurors.
D. Unconstitutional 'Mandatory' Presumptions and Burden Shifting
Two weeks after deciding Ulster County, the Supreme Court
and the Law of Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 23; Finkelstein & Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identifi-
cation Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 504 (1970) ("one can . . . interpret subjective
probability of (e.g.) guilt as the relative frequency of guilt over cases judged to be similar by
the degree of belief they engender"); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
The Supreme Court has decided comparable statistical issues in civil discrimination
cases. In doing so, the Court has indicated its consistent, if often unexpressed, approval of
the 5% threshold level of statistical significance that is conventionally used in the social sci-
ences. Since many of the discrimination studies have higher levels of accuracy, this standard
translates into a "wrongful decision" rate of considerably less than 5% in the civil context.
The closest the Court has come to making an explicit statement on its criteria ofstatistical
proof is a famous footnote in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), a leading case in the
race discrimination area. Castaneda concerned a Texas county with a 79.1% Mexican-Ameri-
can population, whose grand jury pools were only approximately 39% Mexican-American
over a period of more than a decade. The Court stated: "As a general rule for such large
samples, if the difference between the expected value and the observed number is greater
than two or three standard deviations, then the hypothesis . . . would be suspect to a social
scientist." Id. at 496 n.17. Two standard deviations would represent about a 5% margin of
error, or a 95% level of confidence that the results reported did not occur merely by chance.
In Castaneda, the observed number of Mexican-Americans differed from the expected number
by about 29 standard deviations. According to the Court's calculations, the corresponding• 140
probability that this disparity occurred by chance was less than 1 in 10 .
In a subsequent case, Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), a
civil case also involving racial discrimination, the Court quoted approvingly the above cited
language from Castaneda, but dropped the qualifying words "to a social scientist," which had
previously suggested that the Court was simply referring to a convention adopted outside the
legal context. Id. at 308 n.14. Lest one conclude that the social scientists necessarily have the
last word in such matters, the Court inserted a vague disclaimer later in Hazelwood, cautioning
that "Itihese observations are not intended to suggest that precise calculations of statistical
significance are necessary in employing statistical proof .. " Id. at 311 n.17.
For an excellent review of these issues, see Kaye, The .Vumbers GaMe: Statistical Inference in
Discrmination Cases, 80 MICH. L. REV. 833 (1982) (reviewing D. BALDUS &J. COLE, STATISTICAL
PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980)); see also D. MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPrS AND CONTROVER-
SIES 291-93 (1979); Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible' Differences: Empirical Research and the
Jury-Size Cases, 73 MiCn. L. REV. 644, 658-59 (1975); Skipper, Guenther & Nass, The Sac'edness
of. 05: A .Vote Concerning the Uses of Statistical Levels of Significance in Social Science, in STATISTICAL
ISSUES: A READER FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 141 (R. Kirk ed. 1972); Smith & Abram,
Quantitative Analysis and Proof of Employment Discimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33, 43-44;
Ulmer, Supreme Court Behavior in Racial Exclusion Cases: 1935-1960, 56 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 325
(1962). See generally D. BALDUS &J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980).
53. See note 70 infra.
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embarked on a course of adjudication oddly against the tenor, if
not the theory, of that case. The decisions in the cases following
provide further evidence that Ulster County's mandatory-permis-
sive distinction is an anomaly in the Court's jurisprudence and a
departure from its due process precedents.
In Sandstrom v. Montana,54 a unanimous Court held that a
mandatory deliberate-homicide jury instruction (stating that "the
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of
his voluntary acts") violated the Winship reasonable doubt stan-
dard.55 A mandatory presumption is impermissible under Win-
ship and Mullaney if it shifts the "burden of persuasion" to the
defendant on an element of the crime with which he or she is
charged. The Sandstrom Court reserved judgment on whether a
mandatory presumption that shifts merely the "burden of pro-
duction" is permissible. 56
Sandstrom applied a "rhetorical" analysis and the psychology
of the "reasonable juror" to the task of reviewing presumptions.
The Court noted that determining the nature of a presumption
"requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the
jury. . . for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitu-
tional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror
could have interpreted the instruction. '5 7 After consulting the
dictionary definition of "presume," and pondering the jury's
likely reaction to being told that "the law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts," the
Sandstrom Court concluded that a "reasonable juror" might have
interpreted the instruction as shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant on the dispositive issue of intent.58
The judge in Sandstrom instructed the jury that the accused
was presumed innocent until proved guilty and that the state had
the burden of proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt. These
general instructions, however, were "not rhetorically inconsis-
tent with a conclusive or burden-shifting presumption," since the
54. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
55. Id. at 524. The Montana statute at issue defined "deliberate homicide" as "pur-
posely or knowingly" causing the death of another human being. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-
102 (1978).
56. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515, 519, 524 n.8; see also Francis v. Franklin, 105 S. Ct. 1965,
1971 n.3 (1985). But see Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16 (suggesting that mandatory pre-
sumptions shifting the burden of production may also be unconstitutional).
57. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514.
58. Id. at 519.
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jury might have interpreted the unrebutted presumption as sup-
plying proof of intent beyond a reasonable doubt.59 In a brief
concurrence, Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice stated that
they were "loath to see this Court go into the business of parsing
jury instructions," but they nevertheless deferred to the judg-
ment of their colleagues. 60
Last Term, in Francis v. Franklin,6 1 the Court held that a Sand-
strom-type instruction was unconstitutional even when accompa-
nied by an explicit reminder that the presumption was
rebuttable.62 Franklin leveled his due process challenge at the
following two sentences in the jury charge:
The acts of a person of sound mind and discretion are pre-
sumed to be the product of the person's will, but the presump-
tion may be rebutted. A person of sound mind and discretion is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his acts, but the presumption may be rebutted.63
Again, the Court's analysis was a "rhetorical" one:
The challenged sentences are cast in the language of command.
They instruct the jury that "acts of a person of sound mind and
discretion are presumed to be the product of the person's will,"
and that a person "is presumed to intend the natural and prob-
able consequences of his acts," . . . These words carry pre-
cisely the message of the language condemned in Sandstrom
64
Although Franklin's jury, unlike Sandstrom's, was explicitly told
that the presumptions "may be rebutted," the jury might well
have concluded from the preceding mandatory language that it
was required to infer intent to kill (which Franklin denied) as the
natural and probable corollary of firing the gun (which Franklin
admitted), unless the defendant persuaded the jury that such an
inference was unwarranted. 65
Justice Rehnquist dissented, stating that "[s]uch fine parsing
59. l at 518 n.7.
60. Id. at 527 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
61. 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985).
62. Id at 1968-70, 1977. Franklin's sole defense to a charge of "malice murder" was
that he lacked the requisite intent to kill. Id. at 1969.
63. Id at 1969-70.
64. Id. at 1972 (emphasis added by the Court).
65. See id. at 1973 ("The very statement that the presumption 'may be rebutted' could
have indicated to a reasonable juror that the defendant bore an affirmative burden of persua-
sion once the State proved the underlying act giving rise to the presumption."); id. at 1975
("Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm instruction
will not suffice to absolve the infirmity.").
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of the jury instructions given in a state court trial is not required
by anything in the United States Constitution." 66 Justice Rehn-
quist, however, then contributed some fine parsing of his own.67
Indeed, Francis and Sandstrom represent the most elaborate and
detailed analysis of jury instructions and juror psychology that
the Court has ever undertaken. The majority emphasizes the
rhetorical effect of language on the reasonable juror, but pro-
vides little assurance that the Court's understanding of this phe-
nomenon is adequate.6 8 The dissent flatly disagrees with the
Court's legal standard and with its version of the facts. 69 Like-
wise, the majority characterized the presumption at issue in Ulster
County as "permissive" only over the strenuous objections of four
dissenters.70 These sharp variances in interpretation reveal the
66. Id. at 1980 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1983-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
68. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 515 ("Sandstrom's jurors were told that '[t]he law
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.' They were
not told that they had a choice, or that they might infer that conclusion; they were told only
that the law presumed it. It is clear that a reasonable juror could easily have viewed such an
instruction as mandatory."); Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1974 n.7 ("One would expect most of the
juror's reflection about the meaning of the instructions to occur during [the] subsequent de-
liberative stage of the process. Under these circumstances, it is certainly reasonable to expect
ajuror to attempt to make sense of a confusing earlier portion of the instruction by reference
to a later portion of the instruction.").
69. See Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1980, 1985 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1985
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (conceding the validity of the majority's "rhetorical" analysis: "It is
true that the problems raised here probably could be alleviated if the words 'is presumed'
were merely changed to 'may be presumed,' thereby making the presumption permissive
70. The differences between the majority and the dissenters in Ulster CountY turned
largely on how to characterize the presumption at issue. One crucial clause of the jury in-
struction stated: "'[Under] these presumptions . . . upon proof of the presence of the
machine gun and the hand weapons, [the jury] may infer and draw a conclusion that such
prohibited weapon was possessed by each of the defendants who occupied the automobile
. " Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 173 (Powell, J., dissenting). If the four dissenters are cor-
rect, this instruction allowed, or might have caused, the jury to base its decision on the pre-
sumption alone; the prosecution would then have been required to defend, as a general
proposition, the presumption that people present in automobiles containing weapons are,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the possessors of those weapons. Id. at 175-77. The possibility
that the jury disbelieved all of the evidence and relied solely on the presumption was, accord-
ing to the dissenters, simply ignored:
[T]he Court mischaracterizes the function of the presumption charged in this case
... . For all we know, the jury rejected all of the prosecution's evidence concerning
the location and origin of the guns, and based its conclusion that respondents pos-
sessed the weapons solely upon its belief that respondents had been present in the
automobile. . . . By speculating about what the jury may have done with the factual
inference thrust upon it, the Court in effect. . . construct[s] a rule that permits the
use of any inference. . . provided that otherwise there is sufficient evidence in the
record to support a finding of guilt. . ..
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inherent limitations of legal doctrine in the field of presumptions
and suggest the need to apply accepted social science principles
to the legal discussion.7 '
II. A CRITIQUE OF THE PERMISSIVE INFERENCE MODEL
FOR PRESUMPTIONS
The verdict in a "permissive presumption" case can run con-
trary to the jury's true beliefs. Ajudge's instruction on a permis-
sive inference may, in effect, communicate a "mandatory" rule of
law to the jury because of the general aura of legal authority sur-
rounding the presumption or through the formal rhetoric by
which it is conveyed. Without having to meet reasonable-doubt
scrutiny, a permissive presumption may thus have the same effect
as a mandatory presumption. The Supreme Court's concept of
the "reasonable juror," and its conflicting accounts of the rhetor-
ical effects of jury instructions, shed little light on the effect of
permissive presumptions on jurors.
The influence exerted by judicial authority and legal formal-
ism may, moreover, shift responsibility for decisions "upward,"
away from individual jurors, to what they perceive as the legiti-
mate authority. Thesejury verdicts reflect not the "conscience of
the community," but rather the impact of legal doctrine on the
decisions of the jury.
Id. at 175-77 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The majority found, however, after close study of the judge's instructions and the jury
verdict, that the presumption had been interpreted by the jury as permissive, and could thus
be considered "as applied," or in the context of the entire record of evidence. Id at 160-66.
The majority thus avoided a Leay-style examination of the presumption's general validity.
The majority's analysis neglects the possibility that a permissive presumption may imper-
missibly shift the burden of either production or persuasion. The Court must have assumed
that the surrounding evidence was constitutionally sufficient to elevate the impermissible-if-
mandatory presumption to the level of Winship scrutiny, and that the defendant had failed, or
never attempted, to rebut either the presumption itself or the jury's bootstrap. The Court
thus abandoned the requirement that a presumption be accurate beyond a reasonable doubt
(in the application of generalized principles to particular circumstances) in favor of a "nexus"
between the jury's unspoken, empirical beliefs and its acceptance of the prosecution's ex-
press, but undocumented, claim that the presumption is valid. See note 51 supra.
71. Compare Francis, 105 S. Ci. at 1975 n.8 ("the dissent would uphold this conviction
based on an impressionistic and intuitive judgment that it was more likely that the jury under-
stood the charge in a constitutional manner than in an unconstitutional manner") with id. at
1984 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) ("Either the Court is attributing qualities to the average juror
that are found in very few lawyers, or it perversely reads the instructions as a 'looking-glass
charge' which, when held to a mirror, reads more clearly in the opposite direction.") (citing L.
CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss).
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A. Misconceptions of the Effect of Presumptions
on Jury Decisionmaking
According to current Supreme Court doctrine, if a presump-
tion forms the sole basis for a conviction, that presumption
"stands in stead" of the evidence and must satisfy the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.72 If, however, the jury
does not rely solely on the presumption for a conviction, the
"permissive" presumption is considered in the same manner as
other evidence and need only satisfy the general requirements
for admissibility of evidence. 73 The Court's reasoning is pre-
mised on the assumption that juries view permissive inferences as
less binding on them than mandatory presumptions. Acceptance
of a permissive presumption is theoretically purely voluntary.74
But as the case of United States v. Gainey75 demonstrates, this as-
sumption is not as valid as it might initially appear.
The statutory presumption at issue in Gainey deemed pres-
ence at the site of an illegal still, if not explained to the satisfac-
tion of the jury, "sufficient evidence to authorize conviction" for
the substantive crime of carrying on an illegal distilling busi-
ness. 76 Although the trial judge repeated this provision verbatim
to the jury, his instructions also made it clear that mere unex-
plained presence at the site of an illegal still was not itself a crime
nor necessarily inconsistent with innocence. 77 Thejudge specifi-
cally encouraged the jury to look beyond the language of the pre-
sumption to the entire record for evidence to support its
verdict. 78
Although the majority in Gainey upheld the conviction as a
proper application of the presumption, 79 Justice Black dissented,
stating that:
[t]his jury deliberated with the judge's solemn instruction that
Congress had decided that proof of mere unexplained presence
at a still was sufficient to convict. . . . Few jurors could have
failed to believe that it was their duty to convict under this
charge if presence was proved. . . even though all of them...
72. See Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 159-60 & n.17.
73. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
74. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 157.
75. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
76. Id. at 64 n.2.
77. Id. at 69-70.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 67-68.
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might have felt that mere presence alone was not enough to
show guilt.80
Justice Black's point about the impact of authority on jury
decisionmaking-that "permissive" presumptions have an effect
they are not supposed to have-is timely and appropriate. The
Supreme Court currently shows a strong inclination to character-
ize presumptions as "permissive" whenever possible, thereby
granting them the benefits of lowered due process scrutiny. 8'
Even in the case of rebuttable mandatory presumptions the
Court is in profound disagreement about the effect of such in-
structions on jurors. 82
A number of legal and extra-legal studies cast considerable
doubt on the Court's proposition that jurors understand permis-
sive inferences as purely "optional" rules of law.8 3 These empiri-
cal and legal studies indicate that permissive and mandatory
80. Id. at 77 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85-86
(1983) ("[If] the jury may have relied upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence
a reviewing court cannot hold that the error did not contribute to the verdict."); Sand-
strom, 442 U.S. at 526 ("even if a jury could have ignored the presumption. . . we cannot be
certain that this is what they did do"); Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 160 n.17 ("there was . . . no
certainty [in Leary] that the jury had not relied on the presumption"); id. at 175-76 (Powell,J.,
dissenting) ("For all we know, thejury. . . based its conclusion. . . solely upon its belief that
respondents had been present in the automobile. For purposes of reviewing the constitution-
ality of the presumption at issue here, we must assume that this was the case." (footnote
omitted)); Leary, 395 U.S. at 31-32 ("For all we know, the conviction did rest on that ground.
It has long been settled that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the
unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. See, e.g.,
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)."); Tot, 319 U.S. at 469 ("[T]he statute in ques-
tion . . . leaves the jury free to act on the presumption alone once the specified facts are
proved, unless the defendant comes forward with opposing evidence. And this we think
enough to vitiate the statutory provision."); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 235 (1911)
("The point is that. . . the statute authorizes the jury to convict. It is not enough to say that
the jury may not accept that evidence as alone sufficient; for the jury may accept it, and they
have the express warrant of the statute to accept it as a basis for their verdict.").
81. See note 70 supra (describing the Court's conflict in characterizing presumptions).
82. See Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1976 n.9:
ITIhe dissent "simply doles] not believe" that a reasonable juror would have paid
sufficiently close attention to the particular language of the jury instructions to have
been perplexed by the contradictory intent instructions. See post, at 1984 (REHN-
QUIST, J., dissenting). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S., at 528, 99 S.Ct., at
2461 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring) ("I continue to have doubts as to whether this
particular jury was so attentively attuned to the instructions of the trial court that it
divined the difference recognized by lawyers between 'infer' and 'presume' "). Ap-
parently the dissent would have the degree of attention ajuror is presumed to pay to
particular jury instructions vary with whether a presumption of attentiveness would
help or harm the criminal defendant.
83. See text accompanying notes 38-46, 74 supra.
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presumptions affect juries in similar ways. 84
The thesis that permissive presumptions are permissive only
in theory is facially plausible. Statutorily enacted or judicially
sanctioned permissive inferences have received the official impri-
matur of the state; they have been enshrined in official rules of
law expressed in formal legal language. These official actions
convey disproportionate authority and carry more weight with ju-
ries than other items of admissible evidence.8 5 Juries are thereby
induced to give undue consideration to legal formulas that
clearly disadvantage defendants.86 A series of empirical studies
supports this thesis.
B. Blurring the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction:
Empirical Demonstrations
1. Effects of authority on obedience: The Milgram experiments.
Background. Stanley Milgram's famous experiments on obedi-
ence support the general thesis that perceived authority can dis-
tort individuals' behavior and moral judgment.8 7 In these
experiments, Milgram asked unsuspecting volunteers to assume
the role of a "teacher" in a learning exercise. The "teacher" was
instructed to pose questions to a "learner" and to administer an
electrical shock to the learner if he answered incorrectly. Mil-
gram presented the experiment to the teacher as a study of the
effects of punishment, or "negative reinforcement," on memory
and learning. Actually, Milgram was testing the teacher for his
willingness to administer the electrical shocks. The "learner"
was a trained actor and a member of the experimental team who
did not actually receive any shocks, although almost all of the
84. The remainder of this note examines and evaluates the implications of a number of
empirical studies. The presentation and analysis of these studies are primarily "analogical"
rather than strictly empirical. The studies to be examined shed only indirect light on the
thesis under consideration. The widespread understanding of the applicability-as well as the
limitations-of social psychological research in the realm of legal theory supports an analogi-
cal approach. See note 147 infra; L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCES (2d ed. 1976); Bray & Kerr, The Psychology of the Courtroom, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY
441 (1982); Loftus & Monahan, Trial ly Data: Psychological Research as Legal Evidence, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 270 (1980).
85. See Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 352, 392-93.
86. See id. at 375 ("[Tlhejury took the formula very seriously" in sentencing the defend-
ant to death when a lesser penalty seemed appropriate).
87. See S. MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. MILGRAM];
Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 Hum. REL. 57 (1965); Mil-
gram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 371 (1963).
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teachers believed he did.88
Milgram demonstrated the important effects of authority sys-
tems on obedience. The level of obedience documented in Mil-
gram's experiments depended upon the degree to which the
subjects perceived their actions as subject to that authority.8 9
Other rival explanations for the results-for example, the view
that people are naturally cruel or sadistic-were disproved by
careful variations of the basic experiment in which the subjects
were able to choose whatever level of punishment they deemed
appropriate.90 "With numbing regularity," ordinary, decent, and
responsible citizens were "seduced by the trappings of author-
ity," by the control of their perceptions, and by their "uncritical
acceptance of the experimenter's definition of the situation" into
performing harsh and punitive acts they otherwise would never
have performed. 9 1 Milgram induced in his subjects the impres-
sion that their actions were "mandated" by authority when, in
fact, their participation in the experiment was voluntary and
could be terminated by them at any time.92
88. See S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 171-74. The "shocks" were given in a sequence
running from 15 to 450 volts at 15-volt intervals. ME at 20. These voltage levels were clearly
displayed on the experimental apparatus used by the teacher, as were verbal designations
ranging from "slight shock" (15-60 volts) to "danger: severe shock" (375-450 volts). Id. at
20, 29. For every wrong answer, the subject was to administer the next highest shock in the
series. Id. at 20-21.
The most important version of the experiment was one in which the teacher could hear
the learner's verbal protests from an adjoining room. The learner's protests began at 120
volts with complaints, followed by demands to be released from the experiment (150 volts),
agonized shouts (270 volts), refusal to answer further questions (300 volts), violent, vehe-
ment, and prolonged screams (315 volts), followed finally by dead silence (330 volts). Id. at
23. In these circumstances, the average level ofhighest shock administered was 368 volts, and
25 out of 40 subjects proceeded all the way up to the maximum level of 450 volts. Id. at 35.
Some continued to administer shocks on the assumption that the "learner" was by then dead.
Id. at 76, 87.
The experimental supervisor was an "impassive" and "somewhat stern" man dressed in a
grey technician's coat. Id. at 16. If the subjects hesitated before administering a shock, the
supervisor would calmly advise them that they were required to continue, and that the shocks,
though painful, would cause "no permanent tissue damage." Id. at 19, 21. Further, when the
subjects hesitated the supervisor would respond with a carefully tailored oral "prod," ranging
from "Please continue," to "You have no other choice, you must go on." The supervisor
maintained at all times a professional, "scientific" manner, and always spoke in an even,
unemotional tone of voice. Id. at 21.
89. See id. at 153.
90. These versions served as a crucial control on the experimental findings. Id. at
70-72. In the "control" situation, "the great majority of subjects delivered the very lowest
shocks to the victim when the choice was left up to them." Id. at 72.
91. Id at 123.
92. Id. at 40-41 ("The over-all level of obedience, across all four experimental varia-
443
STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:423
Milgram's experiments were conducted in a modem scientific
laboratory by trained personnel who presided over a formidable
array of scientific equipment. Undoubtedly, this environment en-
hanced the "trappings of authority" and contributed to the re-
suits. The "teachers' " expectations in these circumstances must
have been that the "authorities" exercised rightful control and
legitimate power.9 3 This expectation was reinforced for the sub-
jects by the apparently logical connection between the actions
they were being asked to perform and the scientific goal of in-
creasing knowledge about the nature of memory and learning.94
Milgram thus established that individuals' actions flow not
merely from their autonomous, moral propensities but are also
strongly shaped by their expectations of what appears to be legit-
imate authority.95
tions, requires comment. Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental
breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, almost half the subjects
abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who has no special powers to
enforce his commands. To disobey would bring no material loss or punishment."); see also id.
at 51 (subject insists that his participation is voluntary).
In perhaps the most pitiful and telling reaction to this false sense of obligation, many
subjects offered to return the $4.50 they had already been paid for participating, if only they
could discontinue shocking what they thought was a dying man. When the offers were re-
fused, they continued their grim task. Id. at 47.
93. Milgram defines an authority system, reduced to its essentials, as "a minimum of two
persons sharing the expectation that one of them has the right to prescribe behavior for the
other." Id. at 142-43.
94. Although particular instructions of the supervisor might have been questioned, they
generally appeared appropriate to the subjects when related to the overall goal of scientific
progress. Cf id. at 141, 176, 187, 208 n.14. Residual, "background" authority was supplied
by intangible factors such as a general ideological climate favorable to science and the "broad
institutional accord" that permitted such activities to go on at all. For example, the very fact
that the experiment was being conducted and tolerated in a civilized country implied social
approval. See id. at 142-43.
95. See id. at 103-04, 30-31. Researchers in many different countries have replicated
Milgram's experiments numerous times, often with higher levels of obedience than Milgram
found. See, e.g., Rosenhan, Some Origins of Concern for Others, in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN DEVELOP-
MENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 134 (P. Mussen, J. Langer & M. Covington eds. 1969); Ancona &
Pareyson, Contributo allo studie della aggressione: La Dinimica della obbedienza distruttiva, 29 ARCHIVA
DI PSICOLOGIA NEUROLOGIA E PSICHIATRIA (1968); Kilham & Mann, Level of Destructive Obedience
as a Function of Transmitter and Executant Roles in the ilgram Obedience Paradigm, 29J. PERSONAL-
ITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 696 (1974); Mantell, The Potentialfor Violence in Germany, 27 J. Soc.
ISSUES, No. 4, at 101 (1971).
Other researchers have extended Milgram's work on obedience and studied the effects of
authority on jury decisionmaking. Bray and Noble compared the frequency of guilty verdicts
reached and length of sentences imposed by low and high "authoritarian" juries exposed to
the same simulated trial. See Bray & Noble, Authoritarianism and Decisions of Mock Juries: Evidence
of Jury Bias and Group Polarization, 36J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 1424 (1978). Low
and high "authoritarians" were classified by their performance on a special test developed by
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Implications. Milgram demonstrated that it was possible to
structure situations in which perceived supervisory authority dis-
torted and dominated individuals' beliefs in their actual freedom
to disobey instructions. In many respects, Milgram's experi-
ments are analogous to the legally "ordered" situation in which
jurors are instructed to determine criminal liability in light of a
permissive presumption.96
Like Milgram's subjects, lay jurors in a criminal trial find
themselves in an unfamiliar situation whose features are defined
largely by traditional figures of authority. In the carefully con-
trolled environment of the courtroom, the jurors hear and see
only what the judge determines they will hear and see. More-
over, the jurors "report" to the judge, whom they view as their
ultimate and only neutral source of legal authority. 97
When a judge instructs a jury on a permissive presumption,
jurors attempt to follow it diligently, even if, upon later and more
detached reflection, the inference might appear unduly harsh and
Byrne. See D. BYRNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO PERSONALITY 92-94 (2d ed. 1974). Bray and Noble
found that both high authoritarian jurors and juries reached guilty verdicts more frequently
(455 versus 25%), Bray & Noble, supra, at 1426, and imposed more severe punishment (62
versus 33 years, on average) than low authoritarians in one experimental situation, id. at 1427.
This study differed from Milgram's in that the subjects' "authoritarian" tendencies were
being tested, whereas Milgram picked "average" or "normal" subjects randomly and placed
them in a context of strong authority. Nevertheless, to the extent that Milgram induced high
obedience to authority in his subjects, they begin to resemble Bray and Noble's "high
authoritarians." See also Hollander, Competence and Conformzitv in the Acceptance of Influence, 61 J.
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 365 (1960); Mitchell & Byrne, The Defendant's Dilemma: Effects of
Jurors' Attitudes and Authoritarianism on Judicial Decisions, 25 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY
123 (1973) (more severe punishment by high authoritarians). See generally T.W. ADORNO, E.
FRENKEL-BRUNSWICK, D. LEVINSON & R.N. SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950);
P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1955); M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947); French & Raven, The Bases of Social Power, in STUDIES IN
SOCIAL POWER 150 (D. Cartwright ed. 1959).
96. See Note, Toward Principles ofJuiy Equity, 83 YALE L.J. 1023, 1049-50 (1974), describ-
ing Milgram's experiments and concluding:
Ajudge may be likened to an experimenter as a strong authority figure who instructs
jurors on the requirements of their roles as jurors. If the experimenter can success-
fully instruct his subjects by means available to the judge that the subject's own sense
of fairness or equity is not relevant to his role as subject, then the judge should
likewise be able to persuade jurors that their own personal senses of equity are not
relevant to their roles as jurors.
97. See, e.g., Farley, Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194,
212 (1932) ("[Slince. . .jurors are for the most part ordinary individuals, impressed by the
solemnity and atmosphere of the court into an unwonted timidity and docility, the federal
judge usually has it in his power, if he so wills, to mold a verdict in accord with his own
views.").
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in conflict with the jurors' personal views of the case.98 Although
the judge does not deliberately order a finding of guilt-and in
fact assures the jury it is free to acquit the defendant-the jury
naturally and normally assumes that the judge would not present
the presumption unless it were a wise, sound, and accepted rule
of law.99 Although juries always have an absolute, unreviewable,
and "sovereign" prerogative to bring in an acquittal no matter
what instructions the judge provides, they are never explicitly
told that they have this power.'00 As Kalven and Zeisel conclude,
[T]he jury is not simply a corner gang picked from the street; it
has been invested with a public task, brought under the influ-
ence of ajudge, and put to work in solemn surroundings. Per-
haps one reason why the jury exercises its very real power so
sparingly is because it is officially told it has none. 10 1
The whole context of authority surrounding the judge's instruc-
tion on a permissive presumption thus strongly encourages ju-
rors to apply the inference. In this way, permissive presumptions
function much like mandatory presumptions.
98. Thejuror is told of his legal obligation to follow thejudge's instructions, but the
juror is also likely to be aware of his sovereignty and of the ultimate end of his role-
justice in the individual case. When the juror perceives these two expectations as
being in conflict (i.e., following the judge's instructions would not lead to an equita-
ble result), he will still feel obligated to follow the judge's instructions unless the
justification for disregarding those instructions is sufficiently compelling to permit
the juror to follow his own notions ofjustice. Thus, the juror is expected to tolerate
perceived inequity in the application of general rules of law to the point where he
feels that the resulting inequity would be so great and so certain that his departure
from the general law is justified.
Note, supra note 96, at 1029-30 (footnotes omitted); see also Kadish & Kadish, The Institutional-
ization of Conflict:Jury Acquittals, 27J. Soc. IssuEs 199 (1971).
These assumptions about jury behavior form an integral part of legal doctrine. See, e.g.,
Francis, 105 S. Ct. at 1976 n.9 ("The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of
their task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal
case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.");
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979) ("A crucial assumption underlying [the jury] sys-
tem is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trialjudge. Were this not so, it
would be pointless for a trial court to instruct ajury, and even more pointless for an appellate
court to reverse a criminal conviction because the jury was improperly instructed."); id. at 75
n.7 ("The 'rule'-- indeed, the premise upon which the system of jury trials functions under
the American judicial system-is that juries can be trusted to follow the trial court's
instructions.").
99. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. at 237 ("The normal assumption is that thejury will
follow the statute and, acting in accordance with the authority it confers, will accept as suffi-
cient what the statute expressly so describes.").
100. See text accompanying notes 159-162 infra.
101. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966).
446
January 1986] PRESUMPTIONS
2. Rules of law and jury verdicts. The Simon experiments.
Background. A number of empirical studies describing the ef-
fects of formal legal rules illuminate juries' consideration of per-
missive presumptions. RitaJames Simon's study of experimental
juries addressed the effect of legal rules on juries' verdicts in
criminal cases. 10 2 Simon's juries each heard one of three re-
corded versions of two simulated trials, both involving the in-
sanity defense. 0 3 One trial was closely modeled on the leading
case of Durham v. United States.10 4 The defendant in Durham,
charged with housebreaking, pleaded not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. The second trial was modeled on a case in which a charge
of incest was defended on grounds of insanity. 0 5
In one version of each recorded trial, juries were instructed
on insanity according to the M'Naghten rule: Exculpation is ap-
propriate only if the defendant "is incapable of understanding
the nature, quality and consequences of his acts, or of distin-
guishing between right and wrong. ... 106 In a second version
of each recorded trial, juries were instructed according to the
Durham rule: Exculpation is appropriate only if the defendant's
unlawful act was "the product of a mental disease or defect."'10 7
102. See R. SIMON, THEJURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
R. SIMON]; see also R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 52-57 (1980).
The jurors studied by Simon were "real"jurors in that they were drawn from the regular
jury pools of their jurisdictions and were told by their judges that serving on an experimental
jury was their way of fulfilling jury duty. However, one departure from normal procedure was
the random assignment of all eligible jurors; no jurors were excluded by means ofperemptory
challenges or challenges for cause. R. SIMON, supra, at 40.
103. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 42-58. One of the advantages of using recorded trials
for this sort of research is that many juries can be exposed to the same stimuli. Conclusions
having a high degree of generality can be generated from a comparison of the verdicts of a
large sample ofjuries. By systematically changing different variables and exposing many ju-
ries to different versions of a trial, the effects of these variables can be determined with a high
degree of precision. Id. at 40. In both trials recorded by Simon the judges' instructions to the
juries were treated as independent "variables." Id. at 44-47, 52-53.
For a discussion of methodological issues injury research, see R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N.
PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 37-45 (1983); Note, The Appearance ofJustice: Judges' Verbal and
Nonverbal Behavior in CriminalJury Trals, 38 STAN. L. REV. 89 (1986).
104. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
105. United States v. King, No. 655-5 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Simon considered King a "more
typical" insanity case. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 42.
106. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 45. See M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L.
1843) (to establish an insanity defense, "it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the
committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.").
107. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 45.
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In the third version of each trial, juries were told simply that if
they believed "the defendant was insane at the time he commit-
ted the act of which he was accused, then ... [they] must find
the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity."' 08
Simon found that juries deliberating under the M'Naghten rule
were significantly less likely to acquit the defendant on grounds
of insanity than those who were not instructed. A pre-delibera-
tion survey of individual jurors for the housebreaking trial re-
vealed that 76 percent of the uninstructed jurors were prepared
to vote "not guilty by reason of insanity" (NGI), as opposed to
only 59 percent of those given the M'Naghten instruction.' 0 9 In
their pre-deliberation opinions in the incest trial, the unin-
structed jurors were significantly more likely to acquit the de-
fendant (34 percent NGI) than M'Naghten-instructed jurors were
(24 percent NGI)." 0
The post-deliberation verdicts in the incest trials provided Si-
mon's most interesting and instructive results."' Juries deliber-
ating under the M'Naghten rule were significantly less likely to
acquit the defendant on grounds of insanity (0 percent) than
uninstructed (18 percent) or Durham-instructed (19 percent) ju-
ries. 112 Durham-instructed juries behaved much like uninstructed
juries.'' From the incest cases, Simon concluded that "[w]hen
jurors are permitted to deliberate in the absence of a court-de-
fined criterion of responsibility, they are more likely to find in
favor of the defendant, but no more likely than when they are
instructed under the Durham formula."' 1 4
108. Id. at 46.
109. Id. at 68. Although jurors instructed under the Durham rule behaved more like
uninstructed jurors, the differences between the individual verdicts under the M Naghten and
Durham rules did not attain statistical significance at the .05 level. Id. at 67-68. Differences
among the post-deliberation verdicts of full juries in the housebreaking trial were also "too
small to be given much significance." Id. at 69.
For a discussion of statistical significance and related issues, see R. HASTIE, S. PENROD &
N. PENNINGTON, supra note 103, at 243-46; see also Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study ofJury Instructions, 79 CoLum. L. REv. 1306, 1373-74
(1979).
110. R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 72. Again, the difference between the MANaghten and
Durham versions did not attain statistical significance at the .05 level, although jurors receiving
the Durham instruction behaved more like uninstructed jurors. Id. at 72-73.
111. Because of ambiguities in the psychiatrists' testimony in Durham, Simon concluded
that the incest trial was "a much better test" ofjurors' reactions. Id. at 69-70.
112. See id. at 72. These findings were significant at the .05 level.




The similarity of results for uninstructed and Durham-in-
structed juries probably reflects the juries' sense that the Durham
rule is something of a "non-instruction." Rather than providing
a formal legal definition of insanity, the Durham rule may merely
supply "a practical synonym for insanity.""15 In deciding cases
under the Durham rule, jurors are thrown back on their own un-
derstanding of insanity. They do not have to fit the symptoms of
insanity into the legal categories and criteria of a rule like that of
M'Naghten, which, as Justice Cardozo remarked, "has little rela-
tion to the truths of mental life." '' 16
Implications. Jury deliberation under the M'Naghten instruction
is similar to jury decisionmaking in the shadow of a legal pre-
sumption. The M'Naghten rule infects jury deliberations with "a
legal test which color[s] the evidence and disturb[s] the requisite
judgment of fact . . . . The M'Naghten rule function[s] as a
'brake' upon a jury's disposition to acquit defendants by reason
of insanity.""' 7 In short, although the formal legal rules in Si-
mon's trials did not mesh with jurors' ordinary, pre-legal
understanding, the jurors followed them. Other studies have
demonstrated the sensitivity of the deliberation process to varia-
tions in instructions on rules of law and have suggested that ju-
rors are influenced to conform with the terms of legal rules." ,8
115. de Grazia, The Distinction of Being Mad, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 343 (1955).
116. B. CARDOZO, What Medicine Can Do for the Law, in LAW AND LITERATURE 106 (1931);
see also Durham, 214 F.2d at 875-76 (jury should not be required to depend on "arbitrarily
selected" symptoms that "do not necessarily, or even typically, accompany even the most
serious mental disorder").
117. de Grazia, supra note 115, at 345-46 (footnotes omitted). According to one distin-
guished commentator, a M'Naghten-like formula also distorts the testimony of medical special-
ists on the issue of insanity: "I do not really feel that we psychiatrists want to preempt this
whole area but we do resent having to focus on concepts in which, unfortunately, we have no
very special claim to knowledge. . . . [T]he McNaghten formula. . . forces psychiatrists not
to think in terms of mental disease but in terms of general social behavior, without reference
to the conceptual system with which he is familiar." MODEL PENAL CODE (Tentative Draft No.
4, 1955) (Excerpts from Correspondence Between Dr. Manfred Guttmacher and Herbert
Wechsler Relating to the Problem of Defining the Criteria of Irresponsibility in the Model
Penal Code, Guttmacher to Wechsler, November 22, 1954, at 189) [hereinafter cited as
Guttmacher]. Psychiatric testimony under a M'Naghten rule may even usurp or undermine the
jury's function: "'Since insanity must always be at bottom a matter of the custom and the
opinion of the community, much reason exists for community (judge-jury) judgments of
mental responsibility.' " Id. at 177.
118. Vidmar's 1972 research confirms that jury verdicts are affected when legal forms
are imposed on or made available to juries. Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts
and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALrry & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1972).
When experimental jurors were forced to choose between a first-degree murder verdict or
acquittal, 54% of the jurors found the defendant not guilty. But when "second degree mur-
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When a jury is instructed on a permissive presumption, an
abstract legal rule is imposed upon the jury's decision. This rule
does not necessarily frame the issues in ways that correspond to
the jurors' ordinary, pre-legal understanding of the case. Never-
theless, as suggested by the Milgram and Simon studies, the au-
thority with which the presumption is communicated can
strongly orient-or, if necessary, reorient-the jurors' decision-
making processes so as to bring them into conformity with the
presumption. This "reorientation" seriously challenges the
jury's obligation to act as "the conscience of the community" and
to draw upon ordinary common sense in making its decisions.1 19
C. Blurring the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction:
Legal Demonstrations
1. "The bite offormula" in capital sentencing procedures.
Legal scholars have examined the effects of formal legal rules
on commonsensejury decisionmaking by studying the rhetoric of
eighth amendment jury instructions in capital cases. 120 Under
der" was added as a choice, 92% of the jurors found the defendant guilty of the lesser charge,
none acquitted, and the percentage of first-degree findings declined from 46% to 8%. Id. at
215.
Other researchers have studied the effects of a mandatory death penalty sentencing stat-
ute on the decisions of simulated jurors. One study, for instance, found that jurors acquitted
the defendant more often when the sentence was a mandatory death penalty than when it was
a prison term (80% as opposed to 52% in one situation). Hester & Smith, Effects of a
Mandatory Death Penalty on the Decisions of SimulatedJurors as a Function of Heinousness of the Crime, I
J. CRIM. JUST. 319, 324-25 (1973). Another study examined jurors' sensitivity to rhetorical
variations in "reasonable doubt" instructions. Definitions of reasonable doubt ranging from
"nearly any doubt about the defendant's guilt should qualify as a reasonable doubt" to "a
reasonable doubt must be substantial, nontrivial, defensible," were given to different groups
of experimental jurors at the end of otherwise identical simulated trials. Jurors given a lenient
definition were significantly more willing to convict than those given a stringent definition.
"This small variation at the end of a rather long and complex case produced a difference of
over 26% in the group conviction rate." Kerr, Atkin, Stasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond
a Reasonable Doubt. Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments ofilock
Jurors, 34J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOLoGY 282, 291 (1976). But cf Sealy & Cornish,Juries
and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REv. 208, 222 (L.S.E.Jury Project) (variation of instruc-
tions given to simulated juries had "little effect" on their verdicts).
119. See text accompanying notes 120-141, 148-164 infra.
120. Weisberg, Deregulating Death, supra note 85, at 360-95. Weisberg does not claim for
his "documentary review" the status of an empirical study, id. at 360, but several features of
his methodology make the work particularly useful. First, his sources are actual trials, which
can rarely be studied directly. Second, by comparing (admittedly only a few) jury reactions
before and after Furman, Weisberg is able to control for and isolate the effect he reports,
much as an experimental social scientist would.
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pre-Furman law,' 2 ' judicial instructions and attorney argument
generally could not convey to the jury formal rules or other gui-
dance as to sentencing.1 22 "The instruction [in one such case] is
a noninstruction, almost an anti-instruction," notes Professor
Weisberg. "It impresses on the jury the moral gravity of its task
by telling the jury that the decision comes unaided by the State
... . [T]here are no formal legal rules governing their
decision." 123
Some later statutory schemes made use of a separate penalty
trial in which further instructions on sentencing could be pro-
vided, but the jury was not told how it should apply these instruc-
tions. In one California case of this type, the jury returned to the
courtroom with the following question:
[I]s there an interpretation of the law which may aid the jury in
determining whether the punishment should be a life sentence
or the maximum penalty in a verdict of first degree murder, that
is, does the law consider any legal mitigation in this respect?
[T]here are circumstances which. . . may be considered to be
in mitigation. [We are] not sure how the law defines mitigating
124
The judge read the definition of the word "mitigate" from a dic-
tionary and concluded:
I can't tell you what to do. I gave you all the instructions. You
have the instructions with you and if you can find any mitigating
circumstances in the case, why, if that is what you are looking
for, why it is up to you to find them. I can't tell you anything
about them. 125
The judge's instruction listed factors for the jury to consider, but
"wholly avoid[ed] investing these factors with any formal legal
status or dignifying them with any legal language .... There
[we]re no presumptions or burdens of proof to help decide close
cases."1 26
121. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (strongly opposing use
of legal rules in capital punishment determinations).
122. Weisberg, supra note 85, at 363-65.
123. Id. at 364.
124. People v. Friend, 47 Cal. 2d 749, 760-61, 306 P.2d 463, 470 (1957). Note also the
jury's euphemistic avoidance of the word "death" ("the maximum penalty in a verdict of first
degree murder") and its tendency to personify "the law."
125. Id.
126. Weisberg, supra note 85, at 369 ("[t]he jury instruction here is a sort of opaque




Post-Furman schemes have changed the rules and, thus, the
rhetoric. Judges in many states now instruct juries on sentencing
matters using formal legal language and purportedly systematic
formulas for weighing aggravating against mitigating factors.' 27
However, these formulas may remain insufficient directives and
may still prompt jury requests for additional guidance. In People
v. Neely, 128 for example, the jurors asked the court if they could
"show mercy and give life without possibility [of parole] even
though [they felt] aggravating outweigh[ed] mitigating." 129 In
response, the judge simply reread the relevant sections of the
standard jury instructions; two hours later, the jury sentenced
Neely to death.'30
In Neely, the jury requested "release" from the strictures of
formal legal categories rather than guidance in applying the
formula. It is somewhat perplexing that a jury, which can
"weigh" mitigating circumstances as heavily as it wants, could
find those circumstances outweighed by aggravating ones and
still be reluctant to apply the death penalty. Weisberg analyzes
this situation as follows:
The jurors must have engaged in a two-step process. First, they
articulated some mitigating circumstances in express or legal
terms. Second, they intuited some other reason that made
them reluctant to choose a death sentence, but . . . they were
unable to articulate it as a mitigating circumstance. The jurors
may have learned rather clumsily to think in legal categories.
Having received a formal instruction from the judge, they be-
came confused because they could not capture in legal lan-
guage their own ideas or sentiments about the defendant's just
deserts . . . . [T]he jury took the formula very seriously.' 3 1
By simply rereading the jury instruction and, in effect, reasserting
the primacy of legal categories, the judge relieved the jury of its
dilemma. Not surprisingly, jurors' behavior in these circum-
stances has been explicitly compared to the "teachers' " behavior
in the Milgram studies:
The Milgram experiment bears an eerie similarity to the situa-
127. See id. at 371.
128. No. 40424 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. El Dorado Cty., Dec. 15, 1982).
129. Record at 204, Neely; see also State v. Smith, 305 N.C. 691, 707-10, 292 S.E.2d 264,
274-75 (1982) (similar exchange between judge and jury).
130. See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 372-73.
131. Id. at 373, 375; see also id. at 383 ("The formal, legalistic image of the law of capital
punishment that the jury now receives from the court and the prosecutor is often a great
advantage to the state.").
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tion of Neely's penalty jury in Placerville, California. The jury
in that case asked the judge what personal moral responsibility
it had over the defendant's life. The judge responded with the
nonanswer of repeating the more legalistic of the technical jury
instructions, essentially telling the jury it had no responsibility.
In the very special situation of the criminal courtroom and the
death penalty trial, it seems fairly plausible that a lay jury ex-
posed to the mystifying language of legal formality may indeed
allow its moral sense to be distorted. 132
D. The Practical Effects of Perceived Authority and Formal Legal
Rules on Jury Decisionmaking
1. Jurors' abdication of responsibility to higher authority.
Milgram's "teachers" sought to allay personal concerns about
responsibility for their actions. They often sought explicit assur-
ances that the supervisor would "accept all responsibility" for
their actions. After receiving such assurances, most subjects ap-
peared relieved and proceeded to administer shocks to the "vic-
tim." 1 33 Many subjects stated in post-experiment interviews that
"[i]f it were up to me, I would not have administered shocks to
the learner" 34 and that "I was just doing what I was told."'' 35 As
a result, "[m]any people were unable to realize their values in
action and found themselves continuing in the experiment even
though they disagreed with what they were doing."' 3 6
Such statements are not simple alibis invented in response to
guilt. Rather, deference to authority is a fundamental mode of
thinking that accompanies the perception of oneself as "locked
132. Id. at 392. Weisberg also commented: "Professional actors in legal institutions
rely on doctrine to reassure themselves that the sanctions they inflict follow inevitably from
the demands of neutral, disinterested legal principles rather than from their own choice and
power." Id. at 384-85.
If the death penalty decision contains these moral and psychological elements at
least to some degree, then one could indeed sensibly say that the legal formulas
'distort' the decision. If the decision to kill is indeed fraught with personal moral
intensity, arousing the sentencer's most intense fears and anxieties, then it may be a
harmful illusion for the juror to believe that he or she is choiceless.
Id. at 391.
133. See S. MILGRAM. supra note 87, at 7-8, 145-47, 160-61, 187.
134. Id. at 146.
135. Id. at 8. The results of the "control" version of the experiment (in which the sub-
jects themselves decided what levels of shocks to administer) confirm that such statements are
accurate. See note 90 supra.
136. S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 6; see also id. at 10 ("Some derived satisfaction from




into a subordinate position in a structure of authority."1 37 Mil-
gram's subjects lack, or come to lack in the experimental circum-
stances, the strength of conviction required to disobey the
authority figure. In novel and disorienting situations of this sort,
individuals usually respond to internal conflict by adjusting their
beliefs so that they perceive themselves as not fully responsible
for their actions. In a sense, individuals shift responsibility for
their actions "upward" to the perceived legitimate authority.'3 8
Simon's research also demonstrated how legal rules shift per-
ceptions of responsibility. Traditional juries deliberating prior to
M'Naghten would have resembled Simon's uninstructed juries.
These pre-M'Naghten juries would have proceeded on the prem-
ise that "'[their] collective conscience does not allow punish-
ment where it cannot impose blame' " and that they were
supposed to apply " '[their] inherited ideas of moral responsibil-
ity to individuals prosecuted for crime.' "139 By contrast, the
M'Naghten instruction substituted the authority of a "legal conun-
drum" (whether the defendant knew right from wrong) for the
jurors' lay sense ofjustice or equity (whether the defendant was
insane).' 40 It is clear that jurors' sense of "responsibility" for
their decisionmaking was significantly altered by variations in the
legal rules. As one measure of this phenomenon, Simon re-
ported that the M'Naghten instruction reduced the number ofju-
ror contributions to group verdict discussions.' 4'
137. Id. at 8.
138. Id. at 7-8, 145-46. This behavior may be understood in terms of the social psycho-
logical theory of "cognitive dissonance." When two or more beliefs are consistent, individu-
als experience a satisfying state of "consonance"; when two or more beliefs are inconsistent,
an unpleasent state of "dissonance" results. Professor Festinger has suggested that people
are motivated to reduce cognitive dissonance and that they attempt to do so by changing their
attitudes or beliefs. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
139. Durham, 214 F.2d at 876 (quoting Holloway v. United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666-67,
80 U.S. App. D.C. 3, 4-5 (1945)).
140. See R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 8-9; see also de Grazia, supra note 115, at 339-42,
346.
141. See R. SIMON, supra note 102, at 74-76. "Juror contributions" refers to the total
number of times individual jurors spoke in the group's deliberation. Simon reported the fol-
lowing results for 39 randomly selected juries in the incest trial: Uninstructed-496 verbal
contributions (13 juries); M'Naghten-257 verbal contributions (12 juries); Durhan-564 ver-
bal contributions (14 juries). For the same 39 juries, the mean number of pages in the tran-
scriptions of the juries' deliberations was 43 for uninstructed; 26 for MA'Aaghten; 45 for
Durham.
By each measure, juries considered the uninstructed and Durham-instructed decisions
longer and with more participation than the M'Naghten-instructed decisions: "If length of
deliberation is at all a valid index of the difficulty of the jurors' task or of the jurors' involve-
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2. Doctrinal shifting sub silentio.
In response to the foregoing, it might be argued that the
whole point of these legal rules is to change the substantive law, so
as to limit or restrict the discretion of the jury and thereby make
acquittals harder to obtain. However, this analysis fails to distin-
guish between the legitimate purpose and effect of legal rules
and the often illegitimate effects such rules have on juries. An
"illegitimate" effect is one that exists in the real world but not in
legal doctrine and that undermines sub silentio the traditional
functions of jury deliberation and decisionmaking. Legal doc-
trine is heavily influenced by assumptions about human social
psychology and behavior, but sometimes those assumptions can-
not withstand modern scientific scrutiny.
Social psychological experiments are particularly useful in
testing underlying assumptions about human behavior because
these studies create controlled situations in which specific vari-
ables can be isolated, analyzed, and measured. For example, Mil-
gram's experiments demonstrated systematically how individuals
underestimate the effect of authority on obedience.1 42 Simon's
studies similarly demonstrated how legal rules can distort and
misstate common perceptions of insanity. 143 Finally, the analysis
of jury instructions in capital sentencing procedures demon-
strated the effect of legal doctrine on jury decisionmaking. 144
ment with their task, and we believe it is, then the Durham rule serves to enhance the jurors'
responsibility." Id. at 217. As de Grazia has observed,
[T]he real vice of the M'aghten rule was that it . allowed the court to intrude
upon, if not actually usurp, the jury's rightful province . . . . [R]estor[ing] to the
jury its rightfully predominant role in the community judgment of who should, and
who should not, be relieved of criminal responsibility. . . may indeed be effected by
the Durham decision ....
de Grazia, supra note 115, at 346-47 (footnotes omitted); see also A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY
DEFENSE 91 (1967) (the insanity test is "a normative standard applied to conflicting clusters of
fact and opinion by a jury, an institution which is the traditional embodiment of community
morality and, therefore, well suited to determining whether a particular defendant, and his
act, warrant condemnation rather than compassion").
142. Both laypersons and a panel of experts severely underestimated the influence of
authority on obedience. See S. MILGRAIi, supra note 87, at 30-31.
143. Guttmacher, supra note 117, at 174 (" 'I do not see why the rules of law should be
arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of the time when they were formulated. ...
[T]he M'Naghten Rules are in large measure shams.' "); see also id. at 177-79 (judicial or jury
role should not be forced on psychiatrists, but trust in sound judgment of court and jury is
warranted only when medical data can be fully and accurately presented).
144. See Weisberg, supra note 85, at 388-89 ("The availability of the sort of legal formu-
las that the Supreme Court has encouraged. . . may cause some jurors to vote for the death
penalty where they might otherwise be inclined to afford mercy. . . . [T]he law might permit
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These demonstrations help to clarify the legal-doctrinal analysis
of presumptions.145
Taken together, the empirical and legal analyses strongly sug-
gest that the "dignifying formalities" of an authoritative legal
presumption carry significant weight with juries and reduce their
sense of responsibility and moral sensitivity. An aura of author-
ity, professionalism, and experience surrounds permissive pre-
sumptions because they have been found sufficiently reasonable
and reliable to receive the official legal imprimatur of the state.146
Furthermore, a presumption based on sound empirical general-
izations may well be logically connected with valid penological
objectives and policy considerations. Jurors faced with difficult
choices may understandably place the responsibility for their de-
cisions on higher authorities associated with permissive pre-
sumptions, even if the outcomes run counter to their personal
and moral propensities. 147
a sentencer to rationalize a death sentence which his moral sentiments oppose . ); see also
id. at 388-95.
145. See text accompanying notes 75-80 supra.
146. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 85, at 352 ("A jury facing a difficult moral judgment
on the basis of lots of raw evidence is likely to be somewhat affected by the idea that the
legislature had placed a special imprimatur on the defendant's criminal record .... ").
147. The support these studies offer for the hypothesis may be characterized as indirect
or analogical, requiring a leap in reasoning from experimental conditions to jurors' real-life
behavior. These studies were not specifically designed to test the effects of permissive and
mandatory presumptions on juries. Given judges' reluctance to allow experiments on actual
juries, research based on mock juries remains the best available empirical approach. See R.
HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, supra note 103, at 37, 39; J. KArz, EXPERIMENTATION
WITH HUMAN BEINGS 68-109 (1972); see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 101, at 33-54;
Note, supra note 103, at 1026-28, 1042-50.
Milgram discussed three methodological problems associated with his experiments: (1)
the possibility that his subjects were not representative of the general population; (2) the
possibility that they did not believe they were really administering shocks to the learner; and
(3) the problem of generalizing from the laboratory to the larger world. Milgram easily re-
futed the first two objections. See S. MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 169-74. On the third point,
Milgram noted that the problem of generalization "depends entirely on whether one has
reached a correct theoretical understanding of the relevant process." Id. at 174. Perhaps
"structure" is a better word than "process" for what Milgram had in mind. The claim is that a
correct understanding of the general structure of authority can be developed by analyzing how
individuals become instruments of authority in specific circumstances. "The occasion we
term a psychological experiment shares its essential structural properties with other situations
composed of subordinate and superordinate roles. ... Id. at 175. "[Tlhe essence of obe-
dience, as a psychological process, can be captured by studying the simple situation in which a
man is told by a legitimate authority to act against a third individual." Id. at 177.
Certainly, differences between Milgram's experimental situation and that ofajury should
be noted: Thejury is acting as a group (Milgram also tested this variation, id. at ch. 9, "Group
Effects"); the defendant is not a "volunteer"; and in fact the defendant has probably done
something very bad. But if Milgram is correct in claiming to have discerned a "common psy-
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3. The social function of the jury.
Several leading Supreme Court cases have described impor-
tant aspects of the jury's function in the legal system. The Win-
ship decision indicated that use of the reasonable-doubt standard
was "indispensable to command the respect and confidence of
the community in applications of the criminal law."1 48 Jurors
must not perceive that innocent men are being convicted with
less than utmost certainty; the Court concluded that "[i]t is criti-
cal that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted."' 49
In Jilliams v. Florida,'50 the Court specifically inquired into
"the purposes of the jury trial" in criminal cases. It determined
that one of the "essential" features of the jury trial was "the com-
munity participation and shared responsibility that results from
that group's determination of guilt or innocence.'"'- The Court
noted that it may be "desirable to spread the collective responsi-
bility for the determination of guilt [in capital cases] . . . as a
means of legitimating society's decision to impose the death pen-
alty."1 52 Justice White's concurring opinion in Furman added that
the decision to repose such responsibility in juries was "largely
motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the law and
to bring community judgment to bear on the sentence. .... 153
In JWitherspoon v. Illinois,'54 the Supreme Court stated that the
jury expresses "the conscience of the community."' 55  The
chological process," then his work carries broad implications for jury decisionmaking as well
as for human behavior in other important contexts of authority. See Note, supra note 96, at
1050 n.144.
Simon addressed the problem of generalizability in relation to her work and concluded
that mock juries remain the best available experimental procedure; they permit many different
juries to be exposed to precisely the same stimuli and allow for easy alteration of variables.
See R. SimON, supra note 102, at 34-42.
148. lVinship, 397 U.S. at 364.
149. Id.
150. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
151. Id. at 100.
152. Id. at 103.
153. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring); see also
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (jury trial assures "community participation in
the determination of guilt or innocence"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (changes in
sentencing reflect "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety"); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 101, at 7-9, 493-96; Van Dyke, Theflay as a Political
Institution, 16 CATH. LAw. 224 (1970).
154. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
155. Id. at 519 & n.15 (juries also "'maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system' ") (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
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phrase was used a year later in United States v. Spock.' 5 6 The trial
judge in Spock had given the jury a special interrogatory, consist-
ing of ten questions to be answered if the jury reached a general
verdict of guilty. The reviewing court expressed concern about
this form of "judicial pressure" and about the "subtle, and per-
haps open, direct effect that answering special questions may
have upon the jury's ultimate conclusion. . .. Ajuror, wishing
to acquit, may be formally catechized."' 157 Even when con-
fronting formally proper questions, "the jury, as the conscience
of the community, must be permitted to look at more than
logic." 158 The same is true for formally proper presumptions.
The importance of such extra-legal considerations is explicitly
recognized in the theory of jury nullification.1 59 The main issue
in jury nullification debates is whether the jury must enforce the
law as prescribed by the judge or may make an independent deci-
sion as to whether the defendant's conduct constituted a crime.
The prevailing answer is that the jury has an unreviewable, "sov-
ereign" prerogative to acquit on the basis of its conscience-"in
the teeth of both law and facts"1 60-but that the jury cannot be
told it has this power.1 61
156. 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969) (jury as "the conscience of the community"); see
also United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1140-42 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., dis-
senting in part) (jury, as "community conscience," disregards strict requirements of law that
cannot be justly applied in a particular case).
157. Spock, 416 F.2d at 181-82 ("By a progression of questions each of which seems to
require an answer unfavorable to the defendant, a reluctant juror may be led to vote for a
conviction which, in the large, he would have resisted. The result may be accomplished by a
majority of the jury, but the course has been initiated by the judge, and directed by him
through the frame of the questions."); see also Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 529-32
(9th Cir. 1946); Commonwealth v. Anthes, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 185, 209-10 (1855); Rex v.
Larkin, [1943] 1 K.B. 174, 175-77; P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 14, 56, 75-91 (1966); T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 137-38 (5th ed. 1956). See generally
Howe,Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939).
158. Spock, 416 F.2d at 182; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. at 157 (juries "serv[e]
some of the very purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed"
by departing from law-bound conclusions); Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 70
(2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, J., concurring) (civil verdicts should conform narrowly to law, but in
criminal prosecutions there are "other considerations"); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note
101, at 495 (juries give recognition to values that fall outside the official rules).
159. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1130-37, 1139-44; See M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DisCR~rON
TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 45-72 (1973). See generally
Sax, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE REV. 481 (1968); Scheffin,
Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 168 (1972).
160. Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
161. See Sparf& Harperi v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895); Dougherty, 473 F.2d at
1136 (advising that "[w]hat makes for health as an occasional medicine would be disastrous as
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One of the more recent arguments against an explicit nullifi-
cation instruction is that "a juror called upon for an involuntary
public service is entitled to the protection. . . that he can fairly
put it to friends and neighbors that he was merely following the
instructions of the court."' 62 One is forcefully reminded of the
excuses of Milgram's teachers as they continued to shock the
learners. 6 3 In short, the "official doctrine" of jury nullification
tends to reduce the jury's sense of responsibility and diminish its
role as the "conscience of the community."
The jury serves important moral, symbolic, and representa-
tional functions in the life of a political community. But the insti-
a daily diet"); M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 159, at 47-48, 54-55; Scheflin, supra note
159, at 169-77.
In the 1783 trial of William Davis Shipley for seditious libel, the presiding magistrate
refused to instruct the jury on nullification, but he did permit defense counsel, the eloquent
Thomas Erskine, to argue to the jury that "they. . . call upon you (jurors] to pronounce that
guilt, which they forbid you to examine into .... Thus, without inquiry into the only cir-
cumstance which can constitute guilt, and without meaning to find the defendant guilty, you
may be seduced into a judgment which your consciences may revolt at. ... Dean of St.
Asaph's Case, 21 How. St. Tr. 847, 906 (1783). In response, the jury brought in the ex-
traordinary verdict of "guilty only of publishing," declining to determine whether or not
Shipley was guilty of libel. Not long thereafter Parliament affirmed the power of juries to
nullify the law, in Fox's Libel Act of 1792, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60, § 1; see 10 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 675-97 (1938); 2J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 298-395 (1883). In the Parliamentary debates on the subject, Earl Camden sup-
ported the measure on the ground that "[s]omejuries were found resolute enough to disre-
gard the instruction, and find a verdict for the defendant. Others were overawed by the
presence, and, perhaps the menaces, of a magistrate, robed, learned, and dignified, and found
a verdict against their consciences. ... 29 PARL. HiST. ENG. 1407 (1792); see also id. at 565,
1044, 1297, 1421.
The 1735 American trial ofJohn Peter Zenger for seditious libel also raised controversial
issues ofjury nullification. Trial ofJohn Peter Zenger, 17 How. St. Tr. 675 (1735). Zenger
was on trial because a newspaper that he published had carried articles critical of governing
British officials. Defense counsel at trial was allowed to argue for "[t]he right of the jury to
find such a verdict as they in their conscience do think is agreeable to their evidence," J.
ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OFJOHN PETER ZENGER 91 (S.N. Katz
ed. 1963), and he insisted that the jurors "have the right beyond all dispute to determine both
the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so." Id. at 78.
Zenger was acquitted, to great popular acclaim.
Such founders of the republic as John Adams also supported the principle ofjury nullifi-
cation. Adams wrote in his diary on February 12, 1771:
[I]s ajuror obliged to give his verdict generally, according to [the judge's] direction,
or even to find the fact specially, and submit the law to the court? Every man, ofany
feeling or conscience, will answer, no. It is not only his right, but his duty, in that
case, to find the verdict according to his own best understanding, judgment, and
conscience, though in direct opposition to the direction of the court.
2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 255 (C.F. Adams ed. 1850).
162. Doughery, 473 F.2d at 1136.
163. See text accompanying note 135 supra.
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tution of the jury does not function properly ifjurors reluctantly
acquiesce before the aura of authority vested in judicial instruc-
tions on presumptions (and other rules of law) rather than en-
force the dictates of their conscience. In such circumstances,
defendants are denied their right to due process of law, and sod-
ety is deprived of the opportunity to express its vital interests in
ways that affirm contemporary standards of behavior.' 64
III. CONCLUSION
The legal analysis presented in Part I suggests that the
mandatory-permissive distinction is incompatible with the
Court's due process precedents. The empirical studies consid-
ered in Part II suggest that the distinction is illusory. Permissive
presumptions can have essentially the same function and effect as
mandatory presumptions in the deliberations of a jury. The
mandatory-permissive distinction does not effectively differenti-
ate between permitted levels of accuracy for empirical generaliza-
tions. Therefore, all presumptions should be treated as
"mandatory" and their empirical premises subjected to reason-
able-doubt scrutiny.
Eliminating the mandatory-permissive distinction would pre-
vent the difficult problems of characterization exemplified by
Ulster County-the very case that set forth the distinction. 65 De-
termining whether the jury might have relied solely on a presump-
tion to convict involves difficult factual inquiries, beginning with,
but not limited to, the actual language of the presumption.' 66
164. Cf Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in 7 MAGNA CHARTA Es-
SAYS: CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OUR TIME 137, 143-44 (A. Howard ed. 1965) ("Trials are like the
miracle or morality plays of ancient times. They dramatically present the conflicting moral
values of a community in a way that could not be done by logical formalization ....
[I]mportant emotional impact upon a society occurs in a criminal trial."); Hart & McNaugh-
ton, Evidence and Inference in the Law, in EVIDENCE AND INFERENCE 48, 52 (D. Lerner ed. 1959)
("A contested lawsuit is society's last line of defense in the indispensable effort to secure the
peaceful settlement of social conflicts."); Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1985) (need to promote public acceptance of
verdicts explains many evidentiary rules and other aspects of the trial process); Tribe, supra
note 52, at 1376 ("[T]here was a wisdom of sorts even in trial by battle-for at least that mode
of ascertaining truth and resolving conflict reflected well the deeply felt beliefs of the times
and places in which it was practiced."); Note, The Death Penalty and Federalism: Eighth Amendment
Constraints on the Allocation of State Decisionmaking Power, 35 STAN. L. REV. 787, 815-20 (1983)
(capital sentencing implicates cultural legitimacy, retributive community catharsis, and gen-
eral social morality).
165. See note 70 supra.
166. See notes 24, 80, and text accompanying notes 68-71 supra.
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"[W]hether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional
rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could
have interpreted the instruction."' 167 Reviewing courts should be
extremely hesitant to resolve these fact-specific disputes and to
declare that a jury could not have relied solely on a presumption to
convict. Legal doctrine becomes socially invalid when it depends
on assumptions about human nature that do not stand up to
modern scientific scrutiny. 68 Removing the mandatory-permis-
sive distinction would help to focus reviewing courts' attention
on a less fact-specific dispute-whether the presumption is em-
pirically valid.
Eliminating the distinction also better conforms the law of
presumptions to the demands of due process. The Court in Win-
ship emphasized the fundamental bias of the criminal law against
erroneous convictions. 69 That bias is expressed in such substan-
tive and procedural features of the criminal law as the "presump-
tion of innocence," the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, the refusal to allow appeals of criminal acquit-
tals, and the refusal to direct guilty verdicts. 170 The proposal ad-
vanced here reorients presumption doctrine in accordance with
that bias by ensuring that no jury can convict upon proof of a fact
satisfying only a "more likely than not" standard. Preventing
mischaracterization of presumptions that are not highly accurate,
which then could be used as a jury's sole basis for conviction,
ensures reasonable-doubt scrutiny of "every fact necessary to
constitute the crime."'' The Winship Court clearly indicated that
the alternative of erroneous convictions presents far graver social
costs than the possibility of an occasional erroneous acquittal. 72
Finally, this note encourages a shift in the "balance of power"
between juries, judges, and legislatures. Two features of juries
have been stressed: their "political" function in representing
and expressing the vital interests of the community at a criminal
167. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514 (emphasis added).
168. See text accompanying notes 142-145 supra.
169. Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64.
170. See Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1071,
1073-77 (1968).
171. Wnship, 397 U.S. at 364.
172. See id at 363-64 (margin of error in litigation must be reduced when "one party has
at stake an interest of transcending value"); see also id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view
the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man
than to let a guilty man go free.").
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trial, and their moral duty to reach decisions in accordance with
their conscience. These features would be enhanced if juries
were less pressured to follow permissive presumptions that do
not satisfy reasonable-doubt scrutiny. 173 As the Supreme Court
has acknowledged, presumptions are simply empirical general-
izations, and they must have a basis in ordinary experience. 174
Prosecutors are free to draw juries' attention to the underlying
factual connections that prompt legislatures to create particular
permissive presumptions in the first place. But without judicial
instructions on such presumptions, juries can more freely assess
those factual inferences and determine whether they indeed ap-
ply to particular defendants in specific cases. 175
Charles Collier
173. See note 4 supra (explaining the inapplicability of the argument from comparative
convenience in the criminal context). Note that the reasonable-doubt standard does not itself
ensure the requisite statistical accuracy of presumptions. Rather, it phrases the implicit value
choice of accuracy in terms that the jury can understand and interpret, thus implicating the
jury's political and moral functions.
174. See text accompanying notes 9-24 supra.
175. Even if the mandatory-permissive distinction is abolished, juries may still be imper-
missibly influenced by mandatory presumptions to disregard their moral and social beliefs.
Reviewing courts should thus continue to consider jury-influencing effects in their reason-
able-doubt review of generalized, presumptive inferences.
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